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Problem area 
A time-based operation, as planned 
in the ATM future, is assumed to 
affect the controllers’ Situation 
Awareness (SA) due to a higher 
priority of meeting a time objective 
and increasing automation. LVNL´s 
future ATM system requires an 
improved punctuality at the Initial 
Approach Fix (IAF) to enable 
Continuous Descent Approaches 
(CDAs) in the Schiphol TMA. This 
paper provides SA requirements on 
the design of controller support 
tools in time-based operations, 
based on a short literature review 
and an empirical study (Real-Time 
Simulation and an Operational 
Trial) executed at Air Traffic 
Control the Netherlands (LVNL).  
 
Description of work 
In order to address these issues the 
SARA concept (Speed And Route 
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Advisor) was tested in a Real-Time 
Simulation (RTS) and an 
Operational Trial. An RTS was 
chosen to evaluate the concept in a 
controlled experimental 
environment. Subsequently the 
Operational Trial was executed to 
further evaluate the concept in a 
real-life work environment. In both 
experiments, the influence of SARA 
on controllers’ performance, 
workload and SA was investigated. 
 
Results and conclusions 
The SARA real-time experiment 
and the Operational Trial results 
showed that this tool does not 
increase the controllers’ workload 
(R/T load, inputs), while the target 
of a higher accuracy at IAF was 
met. The findings have also pointed 
at two major impacts on the 
controllers’ SA as expected from 
the literature. First, controllers are 
currently focusing more on distance 
than on time in forming a mental 
picture of the traffic situation. This 
changes their working strategies in 
sequencing traffic and solving 
conflicts. Second, additional 
automation (cf. SARA advisories) 
could be in conflict with the 
controllers’ own plan of traffic 
handling. They could loose a certain 
‘feeling of control’ and ultimately 
their SA. However, there was a 
strong learning effect already after a 
few experimental sessions. This 
suggests that a gradual 
implementation and training will 
certainly help supporting a smooth 
introduction. Moreover, the impact 
on SA appears to depend on the 
specific design (e.g. Human 
Machine Interface (HMI), 
separation responsibility, quality of 
advisories). 
 
Applicability 
The specific design of the tool and 
the controllers’ familiarity with it 
determine the degree to which a 
sufficient SA could be maintained. 
Therefore the responsibilities 
between the humans and the 
systems should be carefully 
assessed when designing and 
implementing automation solutions. 
 
 
 
Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlaboratorium 
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR 
 
  
   
 
NLR-TP-2009-700 
 
The influence of automation support on 
performance, workload and situation awareness of 
Air Traffic Controllers 
  
G.K. van de Merwe, E.A.P.B. Oprins1, D.J.F. Eriksson2 and 
A.H. van der Plaat2 
 
1 Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland (LVNL), currently employed at TNO Defence and Security 
2 Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland (LVNL) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This report is based on a paper to be published in the International Journal of Aviation Psychology. 
The contents of this report may be cited on condition that full credit is given to NLR and the authors. 
This publication has been refereed by the Advisory Committee AIR TRANSPORT. 
 
Customer National Aerospace Laboratory NLR 
Contract number ---- 
Owner National Aerospace Laboratory NLR 
Division NLR Air Transport  
Distribution Unlimited 
Classification of title Unclassified 
 April 2010 
Approved by: 
Author 
 
 
 
Reviewer Managing department 
i.o.
  
  
NLR-TP-2009-700 
  
 3 
Summary 
A decision support tool, called Speed And Route Advisor (SARA), was developed at Schiphol 
Airport to help air traffic controllers with achieving an increased accuracy in traffic delivery. Its 
influence on controller performance, workload and Situation Awareness (SA) was evaluated in 
a Real-Time Simulation and in an Operational Trial. The findings indicate that this additional 
system support is necessary to achieve higher accuracy without increasing the controllers’ 
workload. At the same time, controllers must stay in-the-loop to maintain SA. This must be kept 
in mind while designing decision support systems such as SARA. 
 
 
  
NLR-TP-2009-700 
  
 4 
Contents 
1 Introduction 7 
2 Work complexity in ATM 7 
2.1 ATC performance 7 
2.2 Workload management 9 
2.3 Situation awareness 9 
3 Automation in ATM 9 
3.1 Workload 10 
3.2 Situation Awareness 10 
3.3 Trust  11 
4 Future ATM developments 11 
4.1 Arrival Management 12 
4.2 Arrival management at Schiphol Airport 12 
5 SARA 13 
5.1 Basic functioning 13 
5.2 The impact of SARA on air traffic controllers 14 
6 Study 1: Real Time Simulation 15 
6.1 Experimental design 15 
6.2 Results 17 
6.2.1 EAT adherence 17 
6.2.2 Workload 18 
6.2.3 Situation Awareness 21 
7 Study 2: Operational Trial 22 
7.1 Experimental design 22 
7.2 Results 23 
7.2.1 EAT adherence 23 
7.2.2 Workload 23 
7.2.3 Situation Awareness 24 
  
NLR-TP-2009-700 
  
 5 
8 General Discussion 25 
8.1 Performance 25 
8.2 Workload 26 
8.3 Situation Awareness 27 
8.4 Future directions: system support in Time-Based Operations 28 
8.5 Conclusion 29 
9 Acknowledgements 29 
10 References 30 
 
 
  
NLR-TP-2009-700 
  
 6 
Abbreviations 
ACC  Area Control Centre 
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
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1 Introduction 
This article describes the influence of a decision support tool named Speed And Route Advisor 
(SARA) on the performance, workload, and Situation Awareness (SA) of air traffic controllers. 
Similar to other process control tasks in transportation (aviation, shipping, railways) or process 
industry (e.g., chemical and nuclear plants), the air traffic control (ATC) task is considered 
highly complex and dynamic (Oprins, 2008). Complex cognitive processes are required to 
handle the large amount of dynamically changing information in a three-dimensional 
environment (Garland, Stein and Muller, 1999). Therefore, ATC is also called a complex 
cognitive or high-performance skill (Schneider, 1990). 
 
Air traffic is expected to grow at many airports, also at Schiphol Airport. At the same time, 
workload for air traffic controllers may not increase in the future because this might cause 
problems with keeping a sufficient number of controllers competent at their tasks. Much ATM 
research (e.g. SESAR, 2007; NextGen, 2007) focuses on the design of decision support tools 
that make it possible for controllers to handle larger amounts of traffic with reduced workload. 
At Air Traffic Control the Netherlands (cf. Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland; LVNL), a Speed 
And Route Advisor was developed (Oprins, Zwaaf, Eriksson, Merwe and Roe, 2009; Merwe, 
Oprins, Plaat, and Eriksson., 2009). This decision support tool provides controllers with a speed 
and a route advice, with which a higher punctuality of flights can be achieved whilst keeping the 
workload of controllers at an acceptable level. However, a potential risk is the possible 
decrement in the controllers’ SA as shown in previous research on automation of ATM systems 
(Endsley, 1997; Metzger, 2001; Metzger and Parasuraman, 2005). The human factor impacts on 
performance, workload and SA must be addressed and evaluated when designing new decision 
support tools.  
 
 
2 Work complexity in ATM 
2.1 ATC performance 
Due to the complex cognitive nature of the ATC task only a small number of people are able to 
acquire the required competences within a reasonable period of training (Schneider, 1990). 
LVNL is coping with a shortage of controllers which is not uncommon at busy and complex 
airports. LVNL is attempting to solve this problem by improving selection and training, and by 
designing new ATM concepts that make the work less complex. As a starting point, a 
competence analysis was performed at LVNL based on literature research and workshops with 
controllers. This has resulted in the so-called ATC Performance Model (Oprins, Burggraaff and 
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Van Weerdenburg, 2006; Oprins, 2008). It visualizes the complex cognitive processes of air 
traffic controllers (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. The ATC Performance Model (Oprins, Burggraaff & Weerdenburg, 2006) 
 
The model shows the importance of cognitive processes. Information processing guides the 
actions which result in safe and efficient handling of traffic. This model has been applied as a 
general framework for selection and training design at LVNL. Since a few years, it is also used 
to assess the impact of developments in ATM system design on the human role of controllers in 
a paper study, called Human Factor Indication (HFI), and in real-time simulations.  
 
Research on training performance of all trainees between 2003 and 2006, using the ATC 
Performance model, has shown that ineffective situation assessment and workload management 
are the two most important reasons for failing (Oprins, 2008). This suggests that these 
competences are more difficult to learn than others and require extra attention in designing less 
complex ATM systems. 
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2.2 Workload management 
Controllers regularly switch between low and high mental workload, depending on the traffic 
situations (e.g., number of aircraft, complexity, peak periods). This is called workload 
management and differs between controllers (Averty, Collet, Dittmar, Athènes and Vernet-
Maury, 2004). Controllers continuously apply strategies, which are individually different, to 
keep safety (e.g. conflict detection), efficiency (e.g. traffic delay) and their own mental 
workload (‘personal efficiency’) in optimal balance (Oprins, 2008). SA is needed to identify and 
enact a safe and efficient solution to solve specific (conflict) situations. In addition, controllers 
keep their own mental workload under control by adjusting their strategies towards less effortful 
if needed. If possible, they revert to routine actions, standard procedures and ‘simple’ solutions 
that need less attention and that gain time, for instance, by a reduction in radiotelephony (R/T). 
Depending on the evolving situation (routine – non-routine), they switch between low and high 
workload. 
 
2.3 Situation awareness 
A common assumption is that operators in dynamic and complex tasks such as ATC create a 
mental representation of the changing environment, which makes it possible to keep the relevant 
but transient information in working memory (Garland, Stein and Muller, 1999). Pattern 
recognition plays a central role; the controller groups aircraft in a certain way to memorize their 
positions. These patterns help them to create order in seemingly chaotic situations by streaming 
traffic flows. Much research has been done on how controllers develop the three-dimensional 
‘mental picture’ of the traffic situation. This is usually referred to as situation assessment, 
defined as follows:  ‘The perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time 
and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near 
future’ (Endsley, 1988; 1995). Situation Awareness is considered the product of the process of 
situation assessment that takes place at three levels: perception (SA1), interpretation (SA2) and 
anticipation (SA3).  
 
 
3 Automation in ATM 
Automated ATM systems, as expected in the near future, should improve the controllers’ 
performance by decreasing their workload and supporting their SA. This might reduce work 
complexity for controllers. With an expected increase in traffic in the future this seems to be a 
challenge. It is assumed that ATM is moving more towards monitoring or ‘supervisory control’ 
(SESAR, 2007; NextGen, 2007). Much research has been done on automation in ATM, for 
instance, in Free Flight concepts (RTCA, 1995, Endsley, 1997; Galster, Duley, Masalonis and 
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Parasuraman, 2001; Metzger, 2001; Metzger and Parasuraman, 2005). Three main issues are 
often evaluated in the design of automated systems: workload, SA and trust (Parasuraman, 
Sheridan and Wickens, 2008). These issues are considered very relevant in the function 
allocation between humans and systems.  
 
3.1 Workload 
Automation usually aims at a reduction of workload, (Metzger and Parasuraman, 2001; Metzger 
and Parasuraman, 2005). However, automation only offers benefits in workload reduction if the 
system is properly designed. Automation can produce both low and high extremes (Miller and 
Parasuraman, 2007). If automation is designed in a ‘clumsy’ manner, workload will be higher, 
e.g. if executing an automated function requires extra data entry or additional cognitive effort. 
Automation often converts manual tasks into monitoring tasks in which humans have a role as 
supervisor. This might impose considerable mental workload on operators even though they 
have to perform fewer (physical) actions (Metzger and Parasuraman, 2005; Miller and 
Parasuraman, 2007). For this reason, it is generally suggested to design an ATM system in 
which controllers maintain an active role in controlling the traffic (Metzger, 2001; Metzger and 
Parasuraman, 2005) especially when they are still responsible for safety. It is assumed that 
automating routine tasks will be beneficial for workload reduction, for instance, in display 
design for controllers (Metzger and Parasuraman, 2005). 
 
3.2 Situation Awareness 
A related issue that supports the active role of controllers refers to the ‘out-of-the-loop’ 
performance problem (Endsley and Kiris, 1995; Metzger, 2001). In case of automation failures 
system operators may have diminished ability to perform tasks manually, due to a reduced 
awareness of the state and processes of the system, i.e. SA. There are three reasons why this 
happens. First, monitoring tasks may lead to vigilance problems because controllers usually 
have much trust in the equipment. This decreases their alertness. Second, passive information 
processing seems to be inferior to active information processing in detecting the need for 
manual intervention and reorientation to the state of the system. Third, without any feedback, 
controllers are really out of the loop and they cannot assess the effectiveness of their requests 
and actions. Humans tend to be less aware of changes in the system when they are not in 
control. Moreover, reduced performance of manual tasks may also be the result of skill 
degradation due to the loss of SA (Miller and Parasuraman, 2007).  
 
More automation can also increase SA (Endsley and Kiris, 1995). It is usually argued that 
automation should support SA by offering better and more integrated information to the 
controllers. Then they will be better able to distribute their attention, and SA will be improved 
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by a strong reduction of workload. A partial automation strategy should keep the negative and 
positive effects in balance.  
 
3.3 Trust 
Trust usually influences the human’s dependence on automation. Human operators do not 
always use automated systems in the way that designers intended, because they trust their own 
abilities to control more than the system (Parasuraman and Wickens, 2008; Parasuraman, 
Sheridan and Wickens, 2008). An important factor is the reliability of automation. Trust in the 
system can also be too high. This may cause overreliance and failure to monitor the raw 
information sources that are input to automation, called ‘complacency’ (Parasuraman and 
Wickens, 2008). This can be avoided by subsequent exposure to automation’s imperfection. 
 
 
4 Future ATM developments 
Increased automation is a central part of most ATM developments. It aims at increasing safety, 
efficiency and capacity of the future ATM systems while keeping work complexity acceptable.  
Automation is being considered for all phases of flight and for all involved parties. This means 
that both the role of the airline and air traffic control will be affected. Automation is prominent 
in both the European Union’s Single European Sky ATM Research initiative (SESAR) and 
Federal Aviation Administration’s NextGen program (SESAR, 2007; NextGen, 2007). These 
programs are aimed at solving the inefficiencies that exist in ATM today. The inefficiencies are 
largely a result of the fragmented development that comes from the fact that each nation is 
responsible for the efficient and safe management of its own airspace. It has resulted in each 
country setting up its own air traffic management with only the most necessary coordination 
with its neighbours.  Though often well suited to the local situation it has resulted in a wide 
variety of solutions making the whole system unnecessarily complex and expensive for the 
airspace user. The phenomenon is seen world wide with Europe being one of the regions 
suffering the most from these negative consequences. 
 
One important challenge for the ATM concepts, where automation may play an important role, 
is the need to find a good balance between the preferences of an individual flight and the need to 
organise efficient traffic streams. Also, the human factor impacts (workload, SA) must be taken 
into account.  
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4.1 Arrival Management 
Arrival management is the area of ATM that deals with air traffic in the last phase of an arrival 
flight. It is concerned with the planning and controlling of aircraft that are landing at an airport. 
At most airports, the ATM system determines a landing sequence that is used by air traffic 
controllers to efficiently guide aircraft to the runway. It is one area where the different needs of 
individual flights (e.g., time schedules, preferred flight profiles for landing) become apparent 
and can lead to problems (e.g. delay). The SESAR Target Concept, that describes the future 
European ATM system, says the following on high density Terminal Manoeuvring Area (TMA) 
operation: ‘In high density traffic terminal areas (depending on the airport and/or the time), an 
efficient airspace organisation combined with advanced airborne and ground systems 
capabilities will be deployed to deliver the necessary capacity, maintain safe separation and 
minimise the environmental impact. The concept recognises that when traffic density is high the 
required capacity may only be achieved at the cost of some constraint on individual optimum 
trajectories’ (SESAR, 2007, p. 24).  This definition allows for both ground and air-based 
systems to be developed to support the arrival management task.   
 
4.2 Arrival management at Schiphol Airport 
At Schiphol Airport, high traffic numbers and bunching associated with peaks puts high 
demands on the controllers’ competences and this makes work complex. Arrival traffic is fed 
from the Area of Responsibility (AoR) of Amsterdam Area Control Centre (ACC) into the 
Schiphol (TMA) via three entry points called Initial Approach Fixes (IAF). ACC controllers are 
required to deliver the arriving aircraft via the IAF within the target of plus or minus two 
minutes from the Expected Approach Time (EAT; i.e. planned time). Traffic streams in the 
TMA are subsequently merged, using radar vectoring, for the landing runway(s) in use. The 
LVNL arrival management strategy aims at reducing complexity for the controllers as well as 
increasing accuracy of delivery at the IAF, without compromising safety. There are three 
reasons for increasing the accuracy of traffic delivery. 
 
First, merging traffic in the TMA is challenging because of the irregularity associated with the 
two minute margin over the IAF. This activity would be easier if all traffic would, on average, 
be delivered to the TMA closer relative to its planned time to increase predictability for the 
TMA controllers. Second, more accurate delivery is marked as an enabler for noise- and 
environmentally friendly conflict-free routes in the TMA. The current system cannot 
accommodate fixed, noise friendly, conflict-free routes in the TMA without a reduction in 
capacity. Third, improved accuracy translates to predictability and transparency to the airspace 
users. Pilots will be better able to manage the most efficient flight profile if their flight is 
planned well ahead, resulting in a reduction in delay and fuel burn. Therefore Amsterdam ACC 
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controllers need to deliver aircraft at a much higher accuracy to meet the target. In the LVNL 
ATM System Strategy a target is assumed of less than plus or minus 30 seconds. 
 
To mitigate the potential increase in workload (Boudes and Cellier, 2000), system support is 
foreseen to enable the increased accuracy performance target to less than plus or minus 30 
seconds. The Speed And Route Advisor tool was designed to support the controllers to meet this 
target. 
 
 
5 SARA 
5.1 Basic functioning 
The SARA tool operates by providing controllers a speed and route combination for every 
inbound flight. The speed and/or route combination is displayed to the controllers and it will 
allow them to give a single speed and route clearance to the aircraft for the entire descent. A 
single clearance will have the potential advantage that it will decrease the workload for the 
controllers and aircrew. It will also allow the aircrew to optimally use the Flight Management 
Computer (FMC) in the descent, thereby optimizing the descent profile as much as possible 
within the active constraints. 
 
The SARA logic works as follows. When a flight arrives within radar coverage of the ATM 
system the system plans its landing time. Subsequently, based on the landing time the Estimated 
Approach Time (EAT) is determined. The EAT is the time slot when the aircraft is planned to 
pass the IAF. The EAT at the IAF functions as an important metering point in arrival 
management. SARA uses the trajectory predictor function in the ATM system to predict when 
the aircraft will be at the IAF. This predicted time is called the Estimated Time Over (ETO). 
SARA then compares the difference between EAT and ETO, and SARA will calculate a new 
speed and route combination that will minimise the difference between the EAT and ETO if the 
difference is 30 seconds or larger. The speed and route combination is then presented to the 
controllers as an advice that will bring the aircraft at the IAF within 30 seconds of the planning. 
The advice is integrated in the aircraft label on the controllers’ display, as shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. A SARA advice as displayed in the aircraft’s track label for the RTS 
 
With SARA, controllers remain in control and are fully responsible for separation of the traffic 
(Prevot, Lee, Callantine and Smith, 2003). SARA only supports with calculating the speed and 
route combination best suited to meet the planning.   
 
5.2 The impact of SARA on air traffic controllers 
With SARA, the operation at Schiphol will gradually change from a tactical first-come-first-
serve operation towards a time-based operation. These operations might have a quite large 
impact on the controllers’ SA, and hence his subsequent capacity to stay in control (e.g. 
Metzger, 2001) However, the degree to which SA is affected depends on the specific 
operational design and task allocation between humans and systems (Miller and Parasuraman, 
2007). The SARA tool could help controllers with instructing the right speeds and routes to 
aircraft in order to meet a specific waypoint on time. This might decrease their workload as 
once the instruction is given the controllers mostly need to monitor the follow up. Only in case 
of a conflict, they would need to give an updated instruction. 
 
With SARA, the time-dimension will become more prominent in the controllers’ mental picture 
in order to plan, prioritize and sequence flows, as well as to assure separation. This requires 
more anticipation and strategic thinking than nowadays. In their current way of working, their 
decisions are based on certain three-dimensional patterns of aircraft in which exact timing over 
a waypoint is a less crucial factor. Being in time at a waypoint within small margins changes the 
LVNL controllers SA because more ‘thinking-in-time’ is required than they are used to. 
Currently the controllers are more ‘thinking-in-distance’ and this determines how they sequence 
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the arrival traffic. Consequently, with SARA tactical control will move towards more strategic 
control (Oprins et al., 2009).  
 
In addition, SARA implies that certain tasks of controllers are moved to the system. This might 
have impact on their workload and SA. Currently, controllers determine the speeds and routes 
for aircraft. SARA will help them in the decision making process by providing speed and route 
advisories. Controllers might lose their feeling of control when their work moves too much 
towards supervisory control (Galster et al., 2001). They might have difficulty to trust the system 
when solutions are in conflict with their own plan and their SA might be undermined 
(Parasuraman, et al. 2008). In other words, they cannot use their own strategies for traffic 
handling anymore. Dependent on the specific design of SARA, controllers could have less 
insight into the specific flight paths of aircraft. Consequently, it might make it difficult for them 
to update their SA if manual interventions are needed in case of system failures and other 
circumstances (e.g. weather) in which SARA may not work. Switching between these 
automated (routine) and manual (non-routine) operations can substantially increase their 
workload. It depends on the frequency of using conventional methods to which extent the 
controllers can act as the fallback.  
 
In order to address these issues the SARA concept was tested in two settings, a Real-Time 
Simulation (RTS) and an Operational Trial. A RTS was chosen to evaluate the concept in a 
controlled experimental environment. Subsequently the Operational Trial was executed to 
further evaluate the concept in a real-life work environment. In both experiments, the influence 
of SARA on controllers’ performance, workload and SA was investigated. 
 
 
6 Study 1: Real Time Simulation 
6.1 Experimental design 
The Real Time Simulations were performed at NLR’s ATC Research SIMulator (NARSIM). 
The experiment was conducted during two days in which eight LVNL controllers participated 
(N=8). A single simulation run involved two controllers working in tandem for parts of the 
LVNL managed airspace (Amsterdam ACC sector 1 and sector 2) with two pseudo-pilots. The 
controllers and the pseudo-pilots communicated using R/T. Four identical runs were executed 
simultaneously. 
 
Two familiarization runs were executed for each pair of controllers to familiarize themselves 
with the simulator the SARA Human Machine Interface (HMI) and the SARA way of working. 
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Next, the controller pairs executed four experimental runs. For comparison purposes, the same 
traffic sample was used for all runs. However, to avoid familiarization with the traffic sample, 
the aircraft call signs were shuffled between each run. Furthermore controllers switched 
working positions to also avoid effects resulting from the familiarity of the controllers with the 
traffic for a specific sector and inter-controller working strategies. The measured traffic sample 
contained 18 flights with destination Schiphol (EHAM). The four experimental runs consisted 
of two baseline runs and two SARA runs. Run 1 resembled current operations and functioned as 
a baseline in which controllers had standard system support and delivered aircraft at the IAF 
with an accuracy of plus or minus 120 seconds or less compared to the EAT. Run 2 functioned 
as a second baseline in which controllers had a stricter time target similar to the SARA runs 
(less than plus or minus 30 seconds) and limited system support. The support consisted of a 
delta time (ΔT; EAT – ETO) presented in the aircraft label. In runs 3 and 4, SARA provided 
speed-only advisories, and speed and route combinations respectively. The properties of the 
simulation runs are depicted in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Properties of the simulation runs 
Run IAF target time (sec) System support 
1 Within +/- 120 Standard 
2 Within +/-  30 Delta T in label 
3 Within +/-  30 SARA speed 
4 Within +/-  30 SARA speed & route 
 
Quantitative and qualitative data was gathered during and after each simulation run. First, the 
accuracy with which the controllers managed to meet the EAT for each aircraft was measured. 
This measurement was called ‘EAT adherence’. As a subjective measure of workload the 
Instantaneous Self Assessment (ISA) was used.  Controllers were prompted for input every 
three minutes. Objective measures of workload consisted of calculating the total number of R/T 
calls (i.e. radiotelephony; the verbal instruction administered to the aircrew), the average time 
spent on R/T by each controller, and the number of instructions entered into the system through 
the Touch Input Devices (TID; i.e. after instructions are given to the aircrew the controller 
enters them into the system via a TID). Directly after each simulator run, the controllers filled in 
an adapted version of the SASHA-Q Situation Awareness questionnaire (Dehn, 2008). 
Additionally, these questionnaires also contained open questions regarding workload, usability 
and acceptance. Interviews were held after each run to obtain in-depth information regarding 
their experiences with SARA. During the runs, four human factor observers were taking notes, 
one per controller pair. 
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6.2 Results  
Repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) were used for statistical comparisons. 
Partial eta-squared (η2) is given as a measure of effect size. Pairwise comparisons were 
performed where appropriate with Bonferroni corrections. For each analysis an α < .05 was 
used. Since the main objective of SARA was to reduce the variability of traffic delivery over the 
IAF this outcome is incorporated in the workload and SA graphs for comparison purposes. 
 
6.2.1 EAT adherence 
Data was obtained for 18 flights in the four experimental runs and was analyzed for missing 
values and outliers. Data was gathered for four pairs of controllers. The results showed a 
significant delivery accuracy improvement when SARA was used (F(3,63) = 40.918, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .661; see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. EAT adherence 
 
The average absolute EAT adherence improved from the two baseline runs (run 1 and 2) to the 
two SARA runs (around 57 and 25 seconds accuracy to around 12 seconds accuracy; run 3 and 
4). No significant differences were found between the speed only and the speed & route 
configurations (run 3 and 4). Interestingly, setting the target at less than 30 seconds and 
providing the controllers with limited system support (a delta T in the aircraft label; run 2) 
already significantly improved the accuracy to approximately 25 seconds.  
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6.2.2 Workload 
 
6.2.2.1 ISA.  
Eight LVNL controllers produced nine ISA scores each during each run (run 1 to 4). A 
significant effect was found between the four runs, F(3,68) = 17.256, p < .001, ηp2 = .432. 
Workload in the SARA runs (run 3 and 4) was rated lower than the second baseline (run 2). Run 
2 imposed a significantly higher workload on the controllers compared to the average of their 
ratings of the other runs, p < .01 (run 2 vs. run 1, 3 and 4). Run 4 (speed and route) was rated to 
be as equally demanding as run 3 (speed-only), p = .701. Compared to the EAT adherence results 
it seems that additional mental effort is required to achieve the improved accuracy. The results 
are depicted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. ISA scores 
6.2.2.2 R/T calls.  
After removing one outlier from the dataset seven measurements were obtained for the total 
number of R/T calls for eight LVNL controllers. A significant effect was found for this type of 
workload measure (F(3,3) = 21.985, p < .05, ηp2 = .956. The SARA speed and routes run (run 4) 
required the lowest number of calls. The number of calls in this run was found to be less than 
baseline run 2 and the SARA speed-only run (run 3). A potential difference was found between 
run 4 and baseline run 1 (p = .067). SARA run 3 did not differ from the two baseline runs (run 1 
and 2). The two baseline runs did not differ from each other. The results are depicted in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Number of R/T calls 
 
6.2.2.3 R/T Time.  
Eight measurements were obtained for the total time spent on R/T calls (in seconds) for the four 
simulation runs. An ANOVA showed significant differences between the four runs, F(3,4) = 
28.951, p < .01, ηp2 = .956. The lowest amount of time spent on R/T was found in the SARA 
speed & route run (run 4). There were no differences found between the first baseline (run 1) and 
the SARA speed only run (run 3). However, these two runs showed a reduced amount of R/T 
time compared to the second baseline (run 1 and 3 vs. run 2). No differences were found between 
the two baseline runs 1 and 2. See Figure 6 for the means for time spent on R/T. 
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Figure 6. Time spent on R/T 
 
6.2.2.4 TID inputs.  
Eight measurements were obtained for the number of TID inputs for the four simulation runs. An 
ANOVA showed significant effects for the number of TID inputs, F(3,4) = 11.091, p < .05, ηp2 
= .893. The lowest number of inputs was found in the SARA speed & route run (run 4) compared 
to baseline run 2 and SARA run 3. A potential difference was visible between baseline run 1 and 
SARA run 4, p = .051. The highest number of inputs was found in baseline run 2 and potentially 
with baseline run 1, p = .081. The results are depicted in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Number of TID inputs 
 
6.2.3 Situation Awareness 
The questions from the SASHA-Q questionnaire were averaged to serve as a total SA score for 
each controller (N=8). Four questions were used that were applicable to both the SARA runs 
(run 3 and 4) and the baseline runs (run 1 and 2). The Repeated Measures ANOVA showed a 
significant difference in SA scores between the four runs (F(3,29) = 37.304, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.794). SARA runs 3 and 4 showed lower SA ratings compared to the two baseline runs 1 and 2. 
No significant differences were found between the two SARA runs (run 3 and 4) as well as 
between the two baseline runs (run 1 and 2). The results are depicted in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Situation Awareness 
 
 
7 Study 2: Operational Trial 
7.1 Experimental design 
Ten controllers participated that were previously involved in the RTS or in earlier development 
of SARA. To minimize the impact of the trial on normal operations a speed-only SARA was 
evaluated. The trial was executed during eight three-hour periods (mornings and afternoons) in 
off-peak traffic which accumulated to 24 hours of measurement time. Baseline measurements 
were taken for comparison purposes on the same day as the trial period with comparable traffic 
and weather conditions. 
 
To minimize the impact on the ATC system an HMI was chosen that was not integrated into the 
system. That is, the SARA system only received information from the operational system and 
was not in interaction with it. This meant that the controller had to read the SARA advisories 
from the HMI that was positioned adjacent to their radar screen.  
 
Quantitative and qualitative information was gathered during the trials. First, the EAT 
adherence was calculated in the same manner as in the RTS. Second, TID inputs and a post-trial 
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questionnaire were used as workload measurements. Third, SA was measured directly after the 
trial using the SASHA-Q. Fourth, Human Factors experts were present during and after the trial 
to observe and take notes of specific behaviour and comments that controllers made. Fifth, 
interviews were held post-trial to address specific issues that may have had occurred during the 
trial and to discuss the general concept. However, due to operational constraints it was not 
possible to acquire all measurements during the baseline condition. Therefore, in this period 
only the objective data could be captured. The subjective data was only captured during the 
SARA trial periods.  
 
7.2 Results  
A total of 260 flights were handled during the measurement period versus 249 in the baseline. 
Traffic volumes varied between 1 and 23 flights per hour over the IAF with an average of 11.5. 
Weather did not have a significant effect on traffic handling. 
 
7.2.1 EAT adherence 
A significant difference was found in EAT adherence between the SARA periods and the 
baseline periods (F(1,502) = 187.6, p < .001,  ηp2 = .272). As is depicted in Figure 9 the mean 
accuracy of aircraft delivery as well as the variability in delivery of traffic is improved. 
 
7.2.2 Workload 
An increase was found in the average number of TID inputs per flight between SARA and the 
baseline (F(1,1278) = 12.24, p < .001, ηp2  = .009).  
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Figure 9. EAT adherence and TID inputs 
 
More specifically it was found that the average number of speed instructions per flight increased 
from .54 in the baseline to .99 in the SARA condition (F(1,1278) = 40.59, p < .001, ηp2  = .031). 
The average number of flight level instructions per aircraft increased from 2.11 to 2.28 
(F(1,1278) = 5.33, p < .05, ηp2  = .004). The average number of heading instructions per flight 
decreased from 1.76 in the baseline to 1.52 in the SARA runs (F(1,1278) = 12.41, p < .001, ηp2  
= .010). These results, although statistically significant, also show a very small effect size 
(smaller than .1) indicating a negligible increase in workload. These findings may have been 
inflated by the number of TID recordings. That is, small significance values in combination with 
very small effect sizes indicate a difference in TID inputs with little meaningful impact. 
 
In the questionnaires the average workload value (3.31) was tested against a reference value (3) 
indicating the baseline. A significant increase in perceived workload by the controllers was 
found using a one-sample t-test (t(26) = 2.264, p < .05).  
 
7.2.3 Situation Awareness 
The SASHA questionnaire results showed an average SA score of 3.24 (out of a range of 1, low 
SA to 5, high SA; SD = .55). The minimum average SA score was 2.43 and a maximum average 
SA score of 4.38 was noted. These numbers could not be compared against a baseline value 
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because the questionnaire was not administered during this period due to operational 
constraints. Therefore, these numbers should be understood in relation to the controller’s 
comments that were captured and analysed in the debriefing sessions. 
 
It was mentioned that in periods of low traffic, few differences were noted in terms of SA. In 
periods of higher traffic numbers comments were made about the difference in traffic handling 
strategies between what SARA suggested and what controllers normally would do. This 
sometimes led to situations in which controllers accepted advisories, but were not completely 
sure how the situation would evolve. This made it more difficult for them to understand when to 
intervene when necessary. This sometimes resulted in relatively late deconfliction of traffic. 
With SARA controllers seemed to monitor the traffic for conflicts more than normally. For 
example, in one situation a controller was monitoring the two aircraft and was unaware that a 
third (trailing) aircraft was levelling off. As a result, this aircraft did not meet the altitude 
constraint at the IAF. 
 
 
8 General Discussion 
The aim of this study was to understand the impact of SARA on controllers’ performance, i.e. 
their ability to more accurately deliver traffic at the IAF. Furthermore, the experiment aimed to 
understand the impact of this support tool on controllers’ workload and SA. 
 
8.1 Performance 
The results showed that with the support of SARA controllers were able to deliver traffic more 
accurately. In the RTS an initial gain in delivery accuracy was seen even when controllers had 
minimal system support (only a delta T in the aircraft label; run 2). However, with the aid of 
SARA this accuracy was further improved (run 3 and 4). Furthermore, in the Operational Trial 
the delivery accuracy as well as variability of traffic delivery was improved when the controllers 
used SARA, even in real-world circumstances.  
 
The stricter focus on time (30 seconds vs. 120 seconds) had a large influence on the working 
strategies of the controllers. Nowadays time is of lesser importance since controllers focus on 
creating 5 nm sequences. When doing so they most often meet the required time over the IAF. 
Therefore, in present operations time is of less importance. With a target of within plus or minus 
30 seconds controllers will have to invest more effort to meet the target and requires a different 
mind set by the controllers. This may mean that generating sequences of 5 nm may not be 
enough to meet the target, but that more precise actions are required. In SESAR and NextGen 
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there is a large focus on stricter time-based operations in which the entire trajectory of an 
aircraft is planned from gate to gate together with strict fixed times over waypoints (SESAR, 
2007). The experiences in this study may shed some light on the expected future working 
methods for controllers. 
 
To fully support controllers in meeting their performance target a proper design of the tool is 
essential. One design decision that was proven to be successful was the use of instant feedback. 
Instant feedback enhances the controllers’ ability to stay on top the traffic situation by ‘scanning 
the traffic, identifying the need for an action, and issuing a proactive instruction’ (Prevot et al., 
2003, p. 8). When controllers issued instructions to the aircraft controllers immediately 
perceived the consequences of their instructions through the change in delta T for that aircraft 
on their HMI. This is in contrast to current operations in which, due to technical reasons, the 
change in delta T only slowly changes closer to the IAF. Any delay in such feedback may cause 
the controllers to become behind in handling other traffic with a reduced performance and 
potential reactive controlling behaviour as a result. The behaviour of the delta T function with 
SARA speed and/or route was shown to be a successful implementation of instant system 
feedback. 
 
8.2 Workload 
With SARA subjective workload (ISA scores) did not increase compared to the baseline in the 
RTS. Objective workload (number of R/T calls and TID inputs) reduced compared to the 
baseline, especially for SARA with speed and route options. However, in the Operational Trial 
these results were not replicated. That is a significant but negligible increase in TID inputs was 
recorded, especially the number of speed instructions. Metzger and Parasuraman (2006) showed 
that communication and coordination tasks can be a considerable source of workload to 
controllers, especially under high-traffic conditions. Our results therefore seem to indicate that 
controllers’ workload is likely to remain equal if not reduced when using SARA. The RTS 
results also showed that workload (subjectively as well as objectively measured) was highest for 
the run with minimal system support (run 2). Some controllers however, mentioned that they felt 
that, with SARA active, other activities needed to be performed and not necessarily more or less. 
That is, a change in working method was experienced by some controllers that may have resulted 
in a lower physical workload, but a similar mental workload. This can partly be explained by the 
fact that the controllers were somewhat unfamiliar with SARA. Although they had previous 
experience, they were still learning, which may have increased their mental workload. The fact 
that objective workload was reduced in the RTS points at an expectable decrease of workload in 
the future, especially under normal traffic conditions. However, specific comments were made 
about an increase in the monitoring of traffic compared to the normal operation that resulted in a 
  
NLR-TP-2009-700 
  
 27 
reduction in available time for managing other traffic. This seemed only to occur in high traffic 
density situations. In low traffic density conditions, controllers reported a decrease in their 
workload.  
 
With the current implementation of SARA only arriving aircraft were provided with speed 
and/or route advisories. This led some controllers to mention that potential difficulty of working 
with two working methods: the arrival traffic stream under SARA advisories and the departure 
traffic stream under ‘normal’ control which could potentially add to their workload. It is 
important to address these issues in terms of training or procedures if SARA is to be used in this 
way. 
 
8.3 Situation Awareness 
Interestingly, in the RTS SA was highest in the two baseline runs (run 1 and 2) and dropped 
significantly when SARA was used (although still rated as above average). The ATC 
Performance Model suggests that SA is one of the prime information processing components of 
controllers (Oprins et al., 2006; Oprins, 2008). Controllers build up a mental picture by 
perceiving, interpreting and anticipating on the traffic stream. Based on this continuous process 
controllers decides on the required instructions for aircraft in the traffic stream. With SARA part 
of this activity is performed by the automation since it provides controllers with advisories that 
have not been part of their mental processes. Alternatively, the mental picture created by the 
controllers and the resulting instructions may differ from the solutions provided by SARA. 
Therefore, it is understandable that controllers rated their SA as lower compared to the baseline 
scenarios. Controllers mentioned that with SARA they felt ‘less engaged’ in the traffic situation 
compared to the baseline runs. This refers to the out-of-the-loop-performance problem as 
described by Endsley and Kiris (1995) in which operators have a reduced awareness of the state 
and processes of the system. SARA had taken over some tasks of controllers and therefore they 
felt less ‘in control’. It was mentioned that with SARA they followed an advice and monitored 
its progress. Some controllers mentioned that they felt that, because SARA produces an advice 
at the FIR entry to meet the time over the IAF, this would mean a solution for more than 
meeting the time alone, i.e. a conflict-free advice. This sometimes lead to controllers solve 
conflicts late rather than early. Furthermore controllers mentioned that when SARA was active, 
they felt that they spent time to understand SARA’s ‘plan’ as part of an effort to create a mental 
picture of the traffic situation in contrast to generating their own plan.  
 
Controllers changed their interaction with the SARA tool during the course of the simulations. It 
was observed that controllers regained some of their SA by not adhering to advisories all the 
time. It was observed that sometimes advisories were used as a ‘general guidance’ to give an 
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aircraft a speed that would more or less be adequate to meet the time over the IAF. When SARA 
provided subsequent advisories, these would first be evaluated by the controllers for their 
usefulness before they were instructed. This was contrary to the controllers’ behaviour early in 
the RTS where every given advice was accepted and instructed by them. This suggests that 
sufficient familiarization with SARA is required before it can be implemented and used in an 
operational setting. In the RTS controllers became more used to SARA after a few hours. The 
experience during the preparation of the Operational Trial showed that little time was required 
to familiarize themselves with the system and the new way of working. Because all controllers 
were previously engaged in the RTS or earlier developments of SARA, they used the tool as a 
guidance mechanism straight away. This has provided useful information for training purposes 
when implementing SARA in an operational setting. 
 
8.4 Future directions: system support in Time-Based Operations  
In this study two versions of automation support were tested: a speed-only options and a speed 
and route option. A third version is foreseen that will incorporate Conflict Management (CM) to 
provide controllers with conflict-free speed and/or route advisories. This particular version of 
SARA was out of the scope of our evaluations and it was therefore not possible to investigate its 
consequences for controllers. However, as shown previously, performance and workload under 
mature Free Flight may hint at considerations for design and implementation of this particular 
version (Galster, Duley, Masalonis and Parasuraman, 2001). In the present study a decrease in 
SA was found with the use of automation support with speed and/or route options. A further 
impact on SA is expected when advisories are conflict free. Checking advisories for potential 
conflicts becomes unnecessary since these are calculated to be conflict free. With controllers 
partially ‘out-of-the-loop’ (Endsley and Kiris, 1995), they may not be up to the challenge, due 
to complacency issues, in case conflicts are not resolvable by SARA (Galster et al., 2001; 
Wickens, Mavor, Parasuraman and McGee, 1998).  
 
Several studies have provided recommendations on the out-of-the-loop-performance problem. It 
has been argued that to keep controllers in the loop, they should retain some of their 
responsibilities and automation should support them in their decision-making (Wickens et al., 
1998). Previous research also showed that controllers more easily accept automation support if 
they are in command (Prevot et al., 2003). That is, they found that solutions over which 
controllers had a choice were more readily accepted compared to solutions that appeared 
automatically. For automation support tools, and in this particular case SARA, this may mean 
that controllers should be able to have a choice about which speed and/or route combination 
they want to issue rather than having the automation present a single solution only. One option 
for keeping controllers in the loop may be to present various conflict-free solutions which the 
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controllers can choose from, possibly with visual support. This way, controllers remain in 
control of the traffic, whilst the automation is able to support controllers in their decision-
making. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
This study demonstrates that decision support tools can improve performance whilst reducing 
workload and supporting Situation Awareness. SARA was designed for air traffic controllers to 
achieve a more accurate traffic delivery. The findings from the RTS and the Operational Trial 
indicate that system support, such as SARA, is needed to improve the performance of the 
current day operations without increasing controllers’ workload. A form of automation support 
was designed that provides controllers with an advice on the optimal solution. Since SARA 
takes over some tasks of controllers, SA was affected in a certain way. Controllers had the 
feeling of being less engaged in their tasks (cf. out-of-the-loop problem; Endsley & Kiris, 
1995). Their working methods changed more than expected, moving towards time-based 
operations. However, it was noticed that more familiarity with SARA improved the controllers’ 
SA and decreased their workload.  In the future, SARA will be further developed in such a way 
that controllers are still in-the-loop to avoid a possible loss of SA, for instance, by offering 
various solutions from which the controllers can choose. The specific design of the tool and the 
controllers’ familiarity with it determine the degree to which a sufficient SA could be 
maintained.  
 
SESAR and NextGen are aiming for stricter time-based-operations with subsequent automation 
support for controllers. More automation is needed to answer the challenges facing the aviation 
industry in terms of safety, efficiency and environment. However, in the current system, and 
likely in the future, humans play a central role (Parasuraman and Wickens, 2008). Therefore the 
responsibilities between the humans and the systems should be carefully assessed when 
designing and implementing automation solutions.  
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